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1. intrOductiOn: Meaning MaKing in language and culture
both culture and language are about making meaning. This view of culture 
comes closest to that proposed by Geertz (1973), who wrote: “man is an 
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to 
be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science 
in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning.” (Geertz, 1973: 
5). In this spirit, I suggest that we approach both culture and language as “webs 
of significance” that people both create and understand. The challenge is to see 
how they are created and understood-often in multiple and alternative ways.
We have a culture when a group of people living in a social, historical, 
and physical environment make sense of their experiences in a more or less 
unified manner. This means, for example, that they understand what other 
people say, they identify objects and events in similar ways, they find or do 
not find behavior appropriate in certain situations, they create objects, texts, 
and discourses that other members of the group find meaningful, and so forth. 
In all of these and innumerable other cases, we have meaning making in some 
form: not only in the sense of producing and understanding language but 
also in the sense of correctly identifying things, finding behavior acceptable 
or unacceptable, being able to follow a conversation, being able to generate 
meaningful objects and behavior for others in the group, and so forth. meaning 
making is a cooperative enterprise (linguistic or otherwise) that always takes 
place in a large set of contexts (ranging from immediate to background) and 
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that occurs with varying degrees of success. People who can successfully 
participate in this kind of meaning making can be said to belong to the same 
culture. Spectacular cases of unsuccessful participation in joint meaning 
making are called “culture shock.” 
This kind of meaning-based approach to culture can be found in Lakoff’s 
work on American politics (Lakoff, 1996), Turner’s (2001) investigations 
into the cognitive dimensions of social science, and Kövecses’s (2005, 2006) 
study of metaphorical aspects of everyday culture. Palmer makes such a 
meaning-based approach the cornerstone of what he calls “cultural linguistics” 
and applies it to three central areas of anthropological linguistics: boasian 
linguistics, ethnosemantics, and the ethnography of speaking (Palmer, 1996: 
4-5).
What is required for meaning making? The main meaning making organ 
is the brain/mind. The BRAIN is the organ that performs the many cognitive 
operations that are needed for making sense of experience and that include 
categorization, figure-ground alignment, framing knowledge, metaphorical 
understanding, and several others. Cognitive linguists and cognitive scientists 
in general are in the business of describing these operations. Cognitive linguists 
believe that the same cognitive operations that human beings use for making 
sense of experience in general are used for making sense of language. On 
this view, language is structured by the same principles of operation as other 
modalities of the mind. However, these cognitive operations are not put to 
use in a universally similar manner, that is, there can be differences in which 
cognitive operations are used to make sense of some experience in preference 
to another and there can be differences in the degree to which particular 
operations are utilized in cultures. This leads to what is called “alternative 
construal” in cognitive linguistics (see Langacker, 1987). moreover, the minds 
that evolve “on brains” in particular cultures are shaped by the various contexts 
(historical, physical, discourse, etc.) that in part constitute cultures (Kövecses, 
2005). This leads to alternative conceptual systems.
many of our most elementary experiences are universal. being in a container, 
walking along a path, resisting some physical force, being in the dark, and so 
forth, are universal experiences that lead to image schemas of various kinds 
(Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). The resulting image schemas (“container,” 
“source-path-goal,” “force,” etc.) provide meaning for much of our experience 
either directly or indirectly in the form of conceptual metaphors. Conceptual 
metaphors may also receive their motivation from certain correlations in 
experience, when, for instance, people see correlations between two events 
(such as adding to the content of a container and the level of the substance 
rising), leading to the metaphor MOre is uP (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
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When meaning making is based on such elementary human experiences, the 
result may be (near-)universal meaning (content) – though under a particular 
interpretation (construal), that is, conceived of “in a certain manner,” to use 
Hoyt Alverson’s phrase (Alverson, 1991: 97). 
Language, on this view, consists of a set of linguistic signs, that is, pairings 
of form and meaning (which can range from simple morphemes to complex 
syntactic constructions). Learning a language means the learning of such 
linguistic signs. Thus, language can be regarded as a repository of meanings 
stored in the form of linguistic signs shared by members of a culture. This 
lends language a historical role in stabilizing and preserving a culture. This 
function becomes especially important in the case of endangered languages 
and it often explains why minorities insist on their language rights. 
members of a culture interact with each other for particular purposes. To 
achieve their goals, they produce particular discourses. Such discourses are 
assemblies of meanings that relate to particular subject matters. When such 
discourses provide a conceptual framework within which significant subject 
matters are discussed in a culture and when they function as latent norms of 
conduct, the discourses can be regarded as ideologies (see, e.g., Charteris-
black, 2004; musolff, 2004; Goatly, 2007). Discourse in this sense is another 
source of making meaning in cultures. A large part of socialization involves the 
learning of how to make meaning in a culture.
In the remainder of this paper, I will explore metaphorical meaning making 
in two of its facets.
2. MetaPhOrical Meaning MaKing
In recent years, a large number of scholars have criticized the theory of 
conceptual metaphor for a variety of reasons (for example, Cameron, 2003, 
2007; Clausner and Croft, 1997; Deignan, 1999; Dobrovolskij and Piirainen, 
2005; Gevaert, 2001, 2005; Pragglejaz Group, 2007; Rakova, 2002; Ritchie, 
2003; Semino, 2005; Steen, 1999; Stefanowitch, 2007; Zinken, 2007). 
Perhaps the most significant element of this criticism was the suggestion that 
conceptual metaphor theory ignores the study of metaphor in the contexts in 
which metaphorical expressions actually occur; namely, in real discourse. The 
claim is that the practitioners of “traditional” conceptual metaphor theory (i.e., 
Lakoff and Johnson and their ardent followers, like myself) set up certain, 
what they call conceptual metaphors and exemplify them with groups of 
(mostly) invented metaphors. In this way, traditional researchers in conceptual 
metaphor theory fail to notice some essential aspects of the study of metaphor 
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and cannot account for phenomena that can only be accounted for if we 
investigate metaphors in real discourse. 
I have responded to several aspects of this criticism in some previous 
publications (Kövecses, 2005; Kövecses, forthcoming, a, b, c) and I do not 
wish to repeat my response here, though it will be necessary to briefly bring 
some of that work into the present discussion. Instead, I will take the advice of 
the critics seriously, look at some pieces of real discourse where metaphors are 
used, and see how “traditional” conceptual metaphor theory can and should be 
modified and changed to accommodate at least some of the criticism. 
3. MetaPhOrical cOherence in discOurse
most researchers who work on metaphor in real discourse would agree 
that a major function of the metaphors we find in discourse is to provide 
coherence (see, for example, Cameron, 2003; Charteris-black, 2004; Chilton, 
1996; Chilton and Ilyin, 1993; Deignan, 2005; Eubanks, 2000; Koller, 2004; 
musolff, 2000, 2004, 2006; Ritchie, 2004a, b; Semino, in press/ 2008). The 
coherence metaphors can provide can be either intertextual or intratextual; that 
is, metaphors can either make several different texts coherent with each other 
or they can lend coherence to a single piece of discourse. 
In some cases of intertextuality, intertextual coherence is achieved through 
inheriting and using a particular conceptual metaphor at different historical 
periods. One of the best examples of this is how several biblical metaphors 
have been recycled over the ages. Shortly after arriving in Durham, where I 
did the research for some of this work, I was given a bookmark in Durham 
cathedral with the following text on it:
Almighty God
Who called your servant Cuthbert
from keeping sheep to follow your son
and to be shepherd of your people.
mercifully grant that we, following his
example and caring for those who are lost,
may bring them home to your fold.
Through your son.
Jesus Christ our Lord.
Amen.
In the prayer, the basic conceptual metaphor is the one in which the shepherd 
is Jesus, the lost sheep are the people who no longer follow God’s teachings, 
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the fold of the sheep is people’s home with God, and for the shepherd to bring 
the sheep back to the fold is for Jesus to save the people. We can lay out these 
correspondences, or mappings, more explicitly as follows:
Source:     Target:
the shepherd    Jesus
the lost sheep    the people who do not follow God
the fold of the sheep   the state of people following God
the shepherd bringing back the sheep Jesus saving the people
This metaphor was reused later on when God called a simple man, called 
Cuthbert, to give up his job (which, significantly, was being a shepherd) and 
become a “shepherd of people.” Here it is Cuthbert (not Jesus) who saves the 
lost people (a set of people different from the ones in Jesus’ times). Finally, in 
the most recent recycling of the metaphor in the prayer said on St Cuthbert’s 
day, 20th march, 2007, the particular values of the metaphor change again. It is 
the priests who live today who try to bring people back to the fold – again, a set 
of people different from either those who lived in Jesus’ or Cuthbert’s times. 
This type of intertextuality characterizes not only Christianity (and other 
religions) through time but many other domains within the same historical 
period. Thus a metaphor can provide coherence across a variety of discourses 
both historically and simultaneously. 
In a similar fashion, the same conceptual metaphor can lend coherence to 
a single text. I call this “intratextual coherence.” The metaphor that structures 
the discourse does not necessarily have to be a deeply entrenched conventional 
conceptual metaphor – it can be, what we can call, a metaphorical analogy 
of any kind. Consider the following three paragraphs, taken from the very 
beginning of a newspaper article: 
Performance targets are identical to the puissance at the Horse of the Year 
Show. You know the one – the high-jump competition, where the poor, dumb 
horse is brought into the ring, asked to clear a massive red wall, and as a reward 
for its heroic effort is promptly brought back and asked to do it all over again, 
only higher. 
I’ve never felt anything but admiration for those puissance horses which, 
not so dumb at all, swiftly realize that the game is a bogey. Why on earth should 
they bother straining heart, sinew and bone to leap higher than their own heads, 
only to be required to jump even higher? And then possibly higher still.
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Hard work and willingness, ponders the clever horse as he chomps in the stable 
that night, clearly bring only punishment. And so next time he’s asked to canter 
up to the big red wall, he plants his front feet in the ground and shakes his 
head. And says, what do you take me for – an idiot? (melanie Reid, The Times, 
monday, February 4, 2008).
Here puissance horses are compared to people, riders to managers, the red 
walls as obstacles to the targets people have to achieve, having to jump over the 
obstacles to being subject to assessment, clearing the obstacles to achieving the 
targets, raising the obstacles to giving more difficult targets, the Horse Show 
to life, and so on and so forth. This elaborate metaphorical analogy provides 
a great deal of structure for the text. As a matter of fact, most of the structure 
of the text is given in terms of the metaphor up to this point in the article, with 
only the first two words (“performance targets”) suggesting what the analogy 
is all about. 
but then in the fourth paragraph the author lays out the correspondences for 
us, probably to make sure that we understand precisely what she has in mind:
Thus it is with work-related targets. most of us will in the course of our careers 
be subject to performance assessments, where we are examined against the 
objectives we were set the previous year, then tasked with new ones.
From this point onward, the article uses predominantly literal language 
with some of the metaphorical language of the Horse Show interspersed in the 
text. At the end, however, the metaphor comes back in full force:
Oh, the bar may be set at what the politicians regard as a reasonable height. 
Aspirational enough to keep them all in power. From the perspective of the 
weary horse, however, we’ve reached the point where whipping doesn’t work, 
but a carrot and a short rest just might.
Clearly, the metaphor is used here at the end of the article to make a point 
emphatically. This is a common rhetorical function that metaphors are assigned 
to perform in discourse. Thus, in addition to providing some of the internal 
coherence of the text, metaphors are often exploited for such and similar 
rhetorical functions (see, for example, Goatly, 1997). 
What I would like to underscore here is that, in many cases, once introduced, 
conceptual metaphors (or metaphorical analogies) appear to have the effect of 
taking over what one says or thinks about a particular subject matter. We push 
the metaphor as far as it fits the target for our purposes. This way, on such 
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occasions, conceptual metaphors or metaphorical analogies can predominate, 
or “rule,” an entire discourse or a stretch of it. 
4. universality and variatiOn in MetaPhOr
Native speakers of all languages use a large number of metaphors when they 
communicate about the world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Such metaphorically 
used words and expressions may vary considerably across different languages. 
For example, the idea that English expresses with the words spending your 
time is expressed in Hungarian as filling your time. The “images” different 
languages and cultures employ code meanings can be extremely diverse. 
Given this diversity, it is natural to ask: Are there any universal metaphors at 
all, if by “universal” we mean those linguistic metaphors that occur in each 
and every language? Not only is this question difficult because it goes against 
our everyday experiences and intuitions as regards metaphorical language in 
diverse cultures, but also because it is extremely difficult to study, given that 
there are 4-6000 languages spoken around the world today. 
However, if we go beyond looking at metaphorically used linguistic 
expressions in different languages, and, instead of linguistic metaphors, 
we look at conceptual metaphors, we begin to notice that many conceptual 
metaphors appear in a wide range of languages. For example, Hoyt Alverson 
(1994) found that the tiMe is sPace conceptual metaphor can be found in such 
diverse languages and cultures as English, mandarin Chinese, Hindi, and 
Sesotho. many other researchers suggested that the same conceptual metaphor 
is present in a large number of additional languages. Several other conceptual 
metaphors appear in a large number of different languages. Kövecses (2000), 
based on evidence from a number of linguists who are native speakers of the 
respective languages, points out that English, Japanese, Chinese, Hungarian, 
Wolof, Zulu, Polish, and others, possess the metaphor an angry PersOn is 
a Pressurized cOntainer to various degrees. Ning Yu’s (1995, 1998) work 
indicates that the metaphor haPPiness is uP is also present not only in English but 
also in Chinese. The system of metaphors called the Event Structure metaphor 
(Lakoff, 1993) includes submetaphors such as causes are fOrces, states are 
cOntainers, PurPOses are destinatiOns, actiOn is MOtiOn, difficulties are 
iMPediMents (tO MOtiOn), and so forth. Remarkably, this set of submetaphors 
occurs, in addition to English, in such widely different languages and cultures 
as Chinese (Yu, 1998) and Hungarian (Kövecses, 2005). Eve Sweetser (1990) 
noticed that the KnOwing is seeing and the more general the Mind is the BOdy 
metaphors can be found in many European languages and are probably good 
candidates for (near-)universal metaphors. As a final example, Lakoff and 
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Johnson (1999) describe the metaphors used for one’s inner life in English. 
It turns out that metaphors such as self cOntrOl is OBject POssessiOn, suBject 
and self are adversaries, the self is a child, are shared by English, Japanese, 
and Hungarian. Given that one’s inner life is a highly elusive phenomenon, 
and hence would seem to be heavily culture- and language-dependent, one 
would expect a great deal of significant cultural variation in such a metaphor. 
All in all, then, we have a number of cases that constitute near-universal or 
potentially universal conceptual metaphors, although not universal metaphors 
in the strong sense. 
How is it possible that such conceptual metaphors exist in such diverse 
languages and cultures? After all, the languages belong to very different 
language families and represent very different cultures of the world. Several 
answers to this question lend themselves for consideration. First, we can 
suggest that by coincidence all these languages developed the same conceptual 
metaphors for happiness, time, purpose, etc. Second, we can consider the 
possibility that languages borrowed the metaphors from each other. Third, we 
can argue that there may be some universal basis for the same metaphors to 
develop in the diverse languages. 
Let us take as an example the haPPiness is uP conceptual metaphor, first 
discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in English. The conceptual metaphor 
can be seen in such linguistic expressions as feeling up, being on cloud nine, 
being high, and others. Yu (1995, 1998) noticed that the conceptual metaphor 
can also be found in Chinese. And evidence shows that it also exists in 
Hungarian. below are some linguistic examples: (Yu used the grammatical 
abbreviations PRT = particle and ASP = aspect marker.)
chinese:
HAPPY IS UP
Ta hen gao-xing.
he very high-spirit
He is very high-spirited/happy.
Ta xing congcong de.
he spirit rise-rise PRT
His spirits are rising and rising./He’s pleased and excited.
Zhe-xia tiqi le wo-de xingzhi.
this-moment raise ASP my mood
This time it lifted my mood/interest.
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hungarian:
HAPPINESS IS UP
Ez a film feldobott.
this the film up-threw-me
This film gave me a high.-This film made me happy.
majd elszáll a boldogságtól.
almost away-flies-he/she the happiness-from
He/she is on cloud nine.
English, mandarin Chinese, and Hungarian (a Finno-Ugric language) 
belong to different language families, which developed independently for 
much of their history. It is also unlikely that the three languages had any 
significant impact on each other in their recent history. This is not to say that 
such an impact never shapes particular languages as regards their metaphors 
(e.g., the processes of globalization and the widespread use of the internet may 
“popularize” certain conceptual metaphors, such as tiMe is a cOMMOdity), but 
only to suggest that the particular haPPiness is uP metaphor does not exist in 
the three languages because, say, Hungarian borrowed it from Chinese and 
English from Hungarian. 
So how did the same conceptual metaphor emerge then in these diverse 
languages? The best answer seems to be that there is some “universal bodily 
experience” that led to its emergence. Lakoff and Johnson argued early that 
English has the metaphor because when we are happy, we tend to be physically 
up, moving around, be active, jump up and down, smile (i.e., turn up the 
corners of the mouth), rather than down, inactive, and static, and so forth. 
These are undoubtedly universal experiences associated with happiness (or 
more precisely, joy), and they are likely to produce potentially universal (or 
near-universal) conceptual metaphors. The emergence of a potentially universal 
conceptual metaphor does not, of course, mean that the linguistic expressions 
themselves will be the same in different languages that possess a particular 
conceptual metaphor (barcelona 2000; Gibbs, 2006; maalej, 2004). 
Kövecses (1990, 2000) proposed, furthermore, that the universal bodily 
experiences can be captured in the conceptual metonymies associated with 
particular concepts. Specifically, in the case of emotion concepts, such as 
happiness, anger, love, pride, and so forth, the metonymies correspond to 
various kinds of physiological, behavioral, and expressive reactions. These 
reactions provide us with a profile of the bodily basis of emotion concepts. 
Thus, the metonymies give us a sense of the embodied nature of concepts, 
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and the embodiment of concepts may be overlapping, that is, (near-)universal, 
across different languages and language families. Such universal embodiment 
may lead to the emergence of shared conceptual metaphors.
Joseph Grady (1997a, b) developed the Lakoff-Johnson view further by 
proposing that we need to distinguish “complex metaphors” from “primary 
metaphors.” His idea was that complex metaphors (e.g., theOries are 
Buildings) are composed of primary metaphors (e.g., lOgical OrganizatiOn 
is Physical structure). The primary metaphors consist of correlations of a 
subjective experience with a physical experience. As a matter of fact, it turned 
out that many of the conceptual metaphors discussed in the cognitive linguistic 
literature are primary metaphors in this sense. For instance, haPPy is uP is best 
viewed as a primary metaphor, where being happy is a subjective experience 
and being physically up is a physical one that is repeatedly associated with 
it. Other primary metaphors include MOre is uP, PurPOses are destinatiOns, 
and intiMacy is clOseness. On this view, it is the primary metaphors that are 
potentially universal.
Primary metaphors function at a fairly local and specific level of 
conceptualization, and hence in the brain. At the same time, we can also 
assume the existence of much more global metaphors. For example, animals 
are commonly viewed as humans and humans as animals; humans are 
commonly conceptualized as objects and objects as humans, and so on. A 
famous example of the “objects as humans” metaphor was described by Keith 
basso (1967), who showed that in the language of the Western Apache cars are 
metaphorically viewed in terms of the human body. In addition, bernd Heine 
and his colleagues work (Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer, 1991, Heine, 1995, 
Heine and Kuteva, 2002) reveals other large-scale metaphorical processes 
people seem to employ (near-)universally; for example, spatial relations are 
commonly understood as parts of the human body (e.g., the head means up and 
the feet means down). These conceptual metaphors seem to be global design-
features of the brain/mind of human beings. 
It seems to be clear at this point that commonality in human experience is a 
major force shaping the metaphors we have. It is this force that gives us many 
of the metaphors that we can take to be near-universal or potentially universal. 
but commonality in human experience is not the only force that plays a role in 
the process of establishing and using metaphors. There are also counterveiling 
forces that work against universality in metaphor production. 
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5. causes Of MetaPhOr variatiOn
Heine’s work also shows that not even such global metaphors as sPatial 
relatiOns are Parts Of the BOdy are universal in an absolute sense. There are 
languages in which spatial relations are conceptualized not as the human but 
as the animal body. He points out that such languages function in societies 
where animal husbandry is a main form of subsistence. This leads us to the 
question: What causes our metaphors to vary as they do? It is convenient 
to set up two large groups of causes: differential experience and differential 
cognitive preferences. Differential experience involves differences in social-
cultural context, in social and personal history, and in what we can term social 
and personal concern or interest (see Kövecses, 2005).
One example of how the social-cultural context can shape conceptual 
metaphors is provided by Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995). They note that 
in the Euro-American tradition it is the classical-medieval notion of the “four 
humors” from which the Euro-American conceptualization of anger (as well 
as that of emotion in general) derived. The humoral view maintains that the 
four fluids (phlegm, black bile, yellow bile, and blood) and the temperatures 
associated with them regulate the vital processes of the human body. They were 
also believed to determine personality types (such as sanguine, melancholy, 
etc.) and account for a number of medical problems. The humoral view exerted 
a major impact on the emergence of the European conception of anger as a hot 
fluid in a pressurized container. By contrast, King (1989) and Yu (1995 and 
1998) suggest that the Chinese concept of “nu” (corresponding to anger) is 
bound up with the notion of “qi,” that is, the energy that flows through the body. 
“Qi” in turn is embedded in not only the psychological (i.e., emotional) but also 
the philosophical and medical discourse of Chinese culture and civilization. 
When “qi” rises in the body, there is anger (“nu”). Without the concept of “qi,” 
it would be difficult to imagine the view of anger in Chinese culture. Thus 
emotion concepts, such as “anger” in English, “düh” in Hungarian (the two 
representing European culture), and “nu” in Chinese, are in part explained in 
the respective cultures by the culture-specific concepts of the four humors and 
“qi,” respectively. It appears that the culture-specific key concepts that operate 
in particular cultures account for many of the specific-level differences among 
the various anger-related concepts and the Pressurized cOntainer metaphor. 
An example of how differences in human concern can create new 
metaphors, consider some well known conceptual metaphors for sadness: 
sadness is dOwn, sadness is a Burden, and sadness is darK. The counterpart of 
sadness is depression in a clinical context. Linda mcmullen and John Conway 
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(2002) studied the metaphors that people with episodes of depression use and, 
with one exception, found the same conceptual metaphors for depression that 
“non-depressed” people use for sadness. They identified the unique metaphor 
as dePressiOn is a caPtOr. Why don’t “merely” sad people talk about sadness 
as being a “captor”? most people do not normally talk about being trapped by, 
wanting to be free of, or wanting to break out of sadness, although these are ways 
of talking and thinking about depression in a clinical context. It makes sense to 
suggest that people with depression use this language and way of thinking about 
their situation because it faithfully captures what they experience and feel. Their 
deep concern is with their unique experiences and feelings that set them apart 
from people who do not have them. It is this concern that gives them the caPtOr 
metaphor for depression. 
People can employ a variety of different cognitive operations in their effort 
to make sense of experience. For example, what I call ‘experiential focus’ 
can have an impact on the specific details of the conceptual metaphors used 
and what is conceptualized metaphorically in one culture can predominantly 
be conceptualized by means of metonymy in another (Kövecses, 2005). The 
universal bodily basis on which universal metaphors could be built may not 
be utilized in the same way or to the same extent in different languages. What 
experiential focus means is that different peoples may be attuned to different 
aspects of their bodily functioning in relation to a metaphorical target domain, 
or that they can ignore or downplay certain aspects of their bodily functioning 
with respect to the metaphorical conceptualization of a target domain. A case 
in point is the conceptualization of anger in English and Chinese. As studies 
of the physiology of anger across several unrelated cultures show, increase 
in skin temperature and blood pressure are universal physiological correlates 
of anger (Levenson, R. W., P. Ekman, K. Heider, and W. V. Friesen, 1992). 
This accounts for the anger is heat metaphor in English and in many other 
languages. However, King’s and Yu’s work mentioned above suggest that the 
conceptualization of anger in terms of heat is much less prevalent in Chinese 
than it is in English. In Chinese, the major metaphors of anger seem to be based 
on pressure–not heat. This indicates that speakers of Chinese have relied on 
a different aspect of their physiology in the metaphorical conceptualization 
of anger than speakers of English. The major point is that in many cases the 
universality of experiential basis does not necessarily lead to universally 
equivalent conceptualization–at least not at the specific level of hot fluids.
Are there any differences in the way the cognitive processes of metaphor 
versus metonymy are used in different languages and cultures? Jonathan 
Charteris-black (2003) examined in great detail how and for what purpose 
three concepts–mouth, tongue, and lip–are figuratively utilized in English and 
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malay. He found similarities in metaphorical conceptualization. For example, 
in both languages, the same underlying conceptual metaphor (e.g., Manner is 
taste) accounts for expressions like honey-tongued and lidah manis (‘tongue 
sweet’) and in both languages such expressions are used for the discourse 
function of evaluating (especially negatively) what a person says. However, he 
also found that the figurative expressions involving the three concepts tended 
to be metonymic in English and metaphoric in malay. In English, more than 
half of the expressions were metonyms, while in malay the vast majority of 
them showed evidence of metaphor (often in combination with metonymy). 
For example, while metonymic expressions like tight-lipped abound in English, 
such expressions are much less frequent in malay. It seems that, at least in 
the domain of speech organs, the employment of these concepts by means of 
figurative processes is partially culture-specific. 
In sum, metaphorical linguistic expressions may vary widely cross-
culturally but many conceptual metaphors appear to be potentially universal 
or near-universal. This happens because people across the world share certain 
bodily experiences. However, even such potentially universal metaphors 
may display variation in their specific details because people do not use their 
cognitive capacities in the same way from culture to culture. moreover, shared 
conceptual metaphors may vary crossculturally in the frequency of their use. 
Finally, many conceptual metaphors are unique to particular (sub)cultures or 
sets of cultures because of differences in such factors as social-cultural context, 
history, or human concern that characterize these cultures.
6. cOnclusiOns
Culture and language are connected in many ways and the interconnections 
can be studied from a variety of different perspectives. Following Clifford 
Geertz, I tried to develop a view of the relationship that is based on how 
we make sense of our experiences–linguistic or otherwise. Recent cognitive 
science and cognitive linguistics provide us with new ideas and methodological 
tools with which we can approach the issue of meaning-making in cultures 
both in its universal aspects and in its infinite cross-cultural variety. If the 
cognitive linguistic view of metaphor is on the right track (as I believe it is), 
a large part of our making sense of the world is based on metaphorical ways 
of speaking and thinking. With the help of our metaphorical meaning-making 
apparatus, we make a large portion of our discourses coherent. Some of the 
metaphors we use for this purpose are universal and some of them are culture-
specific. We have seen the most important causes that make metaphors either 
universal or culture-specific (or a combination of the two). In metaphorical 
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conceptualization, we seem to be under constant pressure to accommodate 
both the force of the body and context. Our metaphorical meaning making is 
the function of these two forces.
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